Information systems form the backbones of the critical infrastructures of modern societies. Unfortunately, these systems are highly vulnerable to attacks that can result in enormous damage.
Background and Motivation
The infrastructure of modern society is controlled by computational systems that are vulnerable to information attacks. There is an urgent need for new approaches to protect the computational infrastructure from such attacks and to enable it to continue functioning even when attacks have been successfully launched.
Our premise is that to protect this infrastructure we need to restructure its software systems as Self Adaptive Survivable Systems. In particular, we believe that a software system must be capable of detecting its own malfunction, it must be capable of diagnosing the cause of the problem, it must be capable of repairing itself, and it must be capable 1 This article describe research conducted at the Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Support for this research was provided by the Information Processing Technology Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under AFRL Contract Numbers FA8750-04-2-0240 and FA8750-04-C-0252 The views presented are those of the author alone and do not represent the view of DARPA or AFRL. 2 A longer version of this paper with more technical details may be found at "http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/37151". of preventing itself from doing harm, even if it is compromised.
This paper describes 2 related systems, PMOP and AW-DRAT that were developed as part of the DARPA Self Regenerative Systems program. These two systems share a base of common tools and were applied to the defense of a common test system. However, PMOP's focus is detection of insider attacks, while AWDRAT's is on external threats. Both share a common philosophy that the system must monitor its own behavior, have models of itself that it can reason about and adapt itself to prevent harm from occurring.
Both PMOP and AWDRAT are model based and detect differences from expected behavior. AWDRAT detects differences from predicted behavior (what the system was contracted to do) and PMOP detects differences from benign behavior (what the larger system -comprising the user and the application -was designed to do). AWDRAT detects when the application has been compromised while the PMOP detects when the user has been compromised.
A Common Monitoring Infrastructure
The common infrastructure shared by these systems is a self-monitoring framework consisting of:
• Wrappers that are placed around critical parts of the system, to collect data and control whether and how application level operations are performed.
• An Architectural System Model that is capable of predicting how the system ought to behave in response to userlevel and internal requests. It is fine-grained enough to provide an architectural level view of how the system operates, but coarse grained enough to avoid excessive overhead.
PMOP and AWDRAT employ two distinct wrapper technologies: SafeFamily [1, 2] and JavaWrap. The first of these encapsulates system DLL's, allowing AWDRAT and PMOP to monitor accesses to external resources such as files or communication ports. The second wrapper facility provides method wrappers for Java programs. These two capabilities are complementary: JavaWrap provides visibility to all application level code, SafeFamily provides visibility to operations that take place below the abstraction barrier of the Java language runtime model, as is shown in Figure 1 . is concerned with threats from insiders. Insiders are distinguished from other attackers by the fact that they have been granted access to the system being defended, have been granted privileges on that system, and know how it operates. This means that we must assume that the insider has all the access, privileges, and knowledge needed to effect an attack Therefore, the PMOP project focuses on detecting the application behavior that will cause harm in the real world.
The PMOP Architecture
The job of the PMOP architecture is to detect and prevent actions that could lead to harm. The components that comprise the overall PMOP architecture are shown in figure 2. Wrappers intercept operator requests issued to the running application and forward the stream of requests to the operational system model which makes predictions about the effects of the actions that the system is asked to perform. The predictions of the operational system model are then assessed for whether they would lead to harmful effects. If so, then a further assessment is made as to the likelihood that the harm was intended. If it appears so then the system increases its degree of suspicion of the user (and notifies human security personnel); if not, then the actions are deemed to be an operator error and feedback is provided to the user. If the user's request is deemed to be legitimate (i.e. causes no harm) then the intercepted operator request is passed to the application to be processed.
A level of suspicion is established by the relative degree to which the user's actions fit the role-based plans to the exclusion of the attack plans. This level of suspicion triggers unique effectors that contain the effects of suspected insider attacks (in a dynamic process-level virtual machine) to protect the system while additional evidence is gathered; Two unique capabilities result from detecting attacks based on model-based predicted harm (about to be) caused to a system: First, there is no need to update the defense as new insider attacks are discovered or new ways to obfuscate them are invented. Second, attacks based on corrupted operand values or the situation in which operations are invoked can be detected and blocked.
Because our attack detectors are model based, and thus harder to fool, the vast majority of insider attacks can be detected and blocked (at least to the level of sophistication of the system models and harm inference reasoning).
The assumption that the insider has all the access, privileges, and knowledge needed for an attack -which defines what it means to be an insider -means that insider attack detection and thwarting must be based on the attack behavior itself. Although detection could occur after the fact, from observation of the damage caused, thwarting requires the detection to occur before the damage has been caused so that it can be prevented.
The detection must therefore be based on pre-damage activity -namely the user's commands or directives to some software system and that software's execution of system level operations to effect those commands or directives. Neither of these phenomena is normally available, but can be made so through proper instrumentation (discussed below).
Operational System Model These additional capabilities do not come for free. They are based on the availability of an individually constructed operational system model, whose quality is determined by the fidelity of that model. In the example system studied in this project, the models were initially propositional rule bases, from which we inferred both the predicted state of the system and the likelihood of harm resulting from the change of state. In addition to modeling the system in its nominal state, one could also model the system in various states of compromise. For example, if a system has had its effective communication bandwidth reduced by a network denial of service attack, we need to infer the effect of user actions in that context, not simply the nominal context. More subtle attacks, as for example, injecting truthful but misleading information into a database, will have to wait for more refined operational system models and more powerful harm-inference reasoners. The operational model we developed for the OASIS system was used to detect corrupted data, effectively data whose use in the final air tasking order would have harmed the mission. The model itself is expressed as a set of rules that constitute the application semantics. The following sample rules are typical of those that determine whether an air tasking order produced by the MAF / CAF operators is harmful.
• Planes cannot land or takeoff in restricted-access zones.
• Refueling can only occur in designated refueling areas.
• The duration of a leg must exceed the time needed to fly that leg (i.e. the distance between its start and end locations) at the plane's maximum speed Malicious Behavior Detector We developed a malicious behavior detector based on data received from PMOP's wrappers that analyzes the application-level user modification history relative to a role-based model of expected behavior. This model identifies both the types of behavior expected in a situation and the means for assessing the appropriateness of the particular behavior observed. The assessment uses a variety of mechanisms for determining the appropriateness of an action such as safety models, plant models, design rules, best practices, and heuristics. This analyzer detects both intentional and accidental actions that harm the system. Intent Inference Inferring the actual intent of an operator is a very difficult task. We use Computational Vulnerability Analysis [3] to develop a library of abstract attack plans that an insider might use to render harm. Similarly we provide a library of abstract normal (or role-based) plans that are consistent with normal operator behavior. Using plan recognition techniques, we then assess how well the logged behavior matches any of these plans and then accordingly score the operator actions.
Demonstration System To demonstrate the applicability of our Misuse Prevention architecture to legacy systems, we chose a moderately large example legacy system to model and defend against insider attacks, the OASIS Dem/Val system, developed under an earlier DARPA program. In particular, we focused mainly on a single application within OA-SIS Dem/Val, the MAF/CAF mission planner, an interactive, Java-based, graphical editor for producing flight plans.
Harm is detected by determining whether the plan satisfies the integrity constraints illustrated above. If not, its publication is blocked to prevent that harm. An analysis is then performed on the offending action, the failed integrity check(s), and the history of operator actions that led to the offending action to determine whether there is a consistent pattern of malicious operator activity.
Validation: Red Team Experiment
In order to validate our system's ability to detect and thwart insider attacks either through the application's GUI or through the operating system GUI (the Explorer process), a Red Team experiment was conducted. Out of 14 attempts to harm the application or induce a false positive, no attacks causing harm and one false positive were induced through the application's GUI, while one attack causing harm and no false positives were induced through the operating system GUI.
AWDRAT: Protecting Against External Threats
AWDRAT provides immunity to compromises of the target system, making it appear self-aware and capable of actively checking that its behavior corresponds to that intended by its designers. "AWDRAT" stands for Architectural-differencing, Wrappers, Diagnosis, Recovery, Adaptivity and Trust-modeling. AWDRAT has been reported on in [4] , so we will only briefly review it here.
The AWDRAT Architecture
The AWDRAT architecture is shown in Figure 3 . This architecture includes a variety of models maintained by AWDRAT (the round boxes in the figure) as well as a number of major computational components (the square boxes in the figure). AWDRAT is provided with a model of the intended behavior of the target system (the System Architectural Model in the figure). The Wrapper Synthesis module in the figure is responsible for synthesizing non-bypassable wrappers (shown in the figure surrounding the target system). These wrappers instrument the target system and deliver observations of its behavior to the component labeled "Architectural Differencer". This module consults the System Architectural Model and check that the observations of the target system's behavior are consistent with the prediction of the System Architectural Model suspending the target system's execution if they are inconsistent. In the event that unanticipated behavior is detected, a description of the discrepancy between expected and actual behaviors is sent to the component labeled Diagnosis in the figure. The Diagnosis module uses Model-Based Diagnosis to determine the possible ways in which the system could have been compromised so as to produce the observed discrepancy. AWDRAT proceeds to use the results of the diagnosis to calculate the types of compromise that may have affected each computational resource of the target system. AWDRAT also calculates the likelihood of each possible compromise. These results are stored in an internal model, labeled "Trust Model" in the figure.
Next, AWDRAT attempts to help the target system recover from the failure. First it uses backup and redundant data to repair any compromised resources (the component labeled Recover and Regeneration in the figure). During (and after) recovery, the module in the figure labeled "Alternative Method Selection" helps the target system avoid using any residual compromised resources by selecting alternative methods that are capable of achieving the target system's goals and that don't require the use of the compromised resources.
Part of the reasoning involved in making these choices is guided by the Trust Model: If a resource is potentially compromised then there is a possibility that any method using it will lead to a system failure. However, some methods might be much more desirable than others because they deliver better quality of service. The method selection module, therefore, attempts to find a combination of method and resources that makes a good tradeoff, maximizing the quality of service rendered and minimizing the risk of system failure. AWDRAT also uses the target system's System Architectural Model to recognize the critical data that must be preserved in case of failure. AWDRAT's Wrapper Synthesizer module generates wrappers that dynamically provision backup copies and redundant encodings of this critical data (labeled Backup Data in the figure).
Experimentation and Results
AWDRAT's goal is to guarantee that the target system faithfully executes the intent of the software designer. To assess AWDRAT we applied it to the defense of the same target system used in the PMOP experiments. We identified the following properties that AWDRAT should guarantee:
• The data structures maintained by the application should accurately reflect user requests.
• The application should not be able to open a port to any application other than to those JBI servers that it must communicate with (i.e. the JBOSS server).
• The application should not be able to write files except in the specified set of directories that constitute its temporary storage areas.
The results of our experiments show that 91% of all attempts to launch an application, write a file other than those sanctioned or to open an un-sanctioned port or to inappropriately modify a MAF data structure were detected and correctly diagnosed. Finally we note that there are no false positives.
Conclusions
AWDRAT and PMOP are frameworks to which an application system may be tethered in order to provide survivability properties such as error detection, fault diagnosis, backup and recovery. They remove the concern for these properties from the domain of the application design team, instead providing these properties as infrastructure services. They use cognitive techniques to provide the target system with the self-awareness and self-adaptivity necessary to monitor its behavior, diagnose failures, adapt and recover from both insider and external attackers. This frees application designers to concentrate on functionality instead of exception handling, and provides a framework for ensuring a high level of system survivablility, independent of the skills of the application designers.
